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Grain elevators often use paper markets to mitigate the risk of (or hedge) their cash grain 
positions, as well as establish a profit margin through basis trading. Typically, merchandisers use 
futures or forward contracts to perform these transactions. However, in order to liquidate a cash 
grain position, grain transportation must be arranged in order to deliver the grain to the buyer. For 
elevators located along the Mississippi River system selling to Gulf export elevators in New 
Orleans, that mode of grain transportation is most likely river barge. Contracts for barges are 
bought and sold by grain merchants either directly with barge lines or through private brokers, and 
barge contract freight rates fluctuate daily based on supply and demand. Many elevators attempt 
to mitigate barge freight price risk by forward contracting barges. Unlike typical forward contracts, 
however, these barge contracts are for the purchase of a service, grain transportation, rather than a 
commodity such as the grain itself. The question that this study seeks to answer is whether a 
systematic pricing bias exists in this market that creates a forward contracting cost to either party 
(buyers or sellers). Results show that a cost of forward contracting barge freight exists at three 
months out, but the magnitude and the party incurring the cost varies by season.  
An additional important price discovery and risk management “paper market” also exists 
in the form of CIF NOLA (cost of insurance and freight, to port of New Orleans) basis bids, traded 
through brokers. These bids function similar to traditional forward contracts, however, like a 
futures market, firms can offset their forward contractual obligations by offsetting positions in a 
liquid off-exchange paper market. Analysis shows that this liquidity, coupled with a good 
institutional balance of long and short market participants mostly removes the pricing bias 
commonly found in forward contracting in corn and soybeans, although a small risk premium still 
exists in wheat and especially sorghum. 
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Grain firms located on or near the Mississippi River or its navigable tributaries often use 
the demand for grain exports from the port of New Orleans as a buyer for their grain, and use the 
river system as a means of transportation for that grain to the port. Grain export firms typically 
buy grain by the barge load, and likewise, river transportation is based on barge loads of grain. 
The typical river barge holds approximately 55,000 bushels of grain, which is a relatively large 
amount compared to other forms of grain transportation. Because of the large scale of sales and 
freight contracts in this river market, the number of firms involved is significantly smaller than the 
number of firms that compete in other forward grain markets, such as commodity futures markets. 
Likewise, the number of individuals with first-knowledge and experience in using this market is 
also small. This dynamic has resulted in an opaque market place upon which this study seeks to 
shed light. 
The CIF NOLA (cost of insurance and freight to New Orleans, Louisiana) export market 
and the Mississippi barge freight market are two pieces of the same puzzle for the movement of 
grain from its origin in the Midwestern United States to export markets around the world. In the 
CIF NOLA market, grain export firms make forward bids for the purchase of barge loads of grain 
to be delivered to them at the port of New Orleans. Correspondingly, barge freight lines or barge 
freight brokers make forward offers for their service of grain transportation via barge so that 
merchandising firms selling grain to export firms can deliver on their contracts. Though these two 
markets serve the same industry, they operate independently of each other, and both markets have 
developed unique characteristics that warrant individual analysis.  
The CIF NOLA forward market operates in a manner seemingly similar to a standard 




what makes this market unique is the ability of participating firms to offset their position (short or 
long) by either buying or selling back the CIF NOLA contract before the delivery period. This 
allows firms to use these contracts as a means of price risk management for cash grain even if the 
firm never intends to deliver on the contract, much like a futures contract. Because of this hybrid 
futures-forward nature of CIF NOLA contracts, it is not clear if its characteristics match that of a 
futures or a forward contract with regards to the existence of a cost of forward contracting, or risk 
premium. To answer this question, we apply a first differences model to determine the existence 
of a consistent bias in forward bids, which, if present, would represent a cost of forward 
contracting. The institutional details of this market are explored through the use of USDA fact 
sheets, first-hand accounts from market participants, relevant literature, and personal knowledge 
gained through research and experience. The potential existence of a cost of forward contract is 
examined through the use of a simple mean of first differences model. The results are then 
explained and conclusions drawn based on empirical results and institutional details.  
The Mississippi River barge freight market too plays a forward contracting role similar to 
a traditional farmer-elevator forward contract, but also has characteristics that make it unique. 
Rather than contracting the sale or purchase of an asset like a traditional forward contract would 
do with agricultural commodities, barge freight forward contracts specify the purchase or sale of 
a service. Also, rather than being arranged directly between the buyer and seller, most barge freight 
contracts are brokered by intermediaries. Given these idiosyncrasies, this market too warrants 
individual analysis to highlight institutional details and determine the existence of a cost of forward 
contracting. The institutional details are garnered from USDA fact sheets, anecdotal accounts from 




cost of forward contracting is analyzed by a logarithmic first differences model. Then, the specifics 
of this market are used to help explain the empirical results. 
The geographic congruence of these two markets clearly provides prudence to the grouping 
of the two studies into one thesis. Grain firms along the Mississippi River system must participate 
in both the CIF NOLA market as well as the barge freight market in order to successfully deliver 
grain to the port of New Orleans for export. Not only are the two markets used in the same region 
by the same industry, they are typically used simultaneously to mitigate price risk for both the sale 
of cash grain as well as transportation costs. Therefore, an analysis of one market should logically 







II. The Cost of Forward Contracting in Mississippi River Barge Freight Market 
Introduction 
The Mississippi River system has been a heavily used route to transport agricultural 
commodities in North America since the colonization of what is now the Central and Midwestern 
regions of the United States. This expansive river system which includes the Mississippi, 
Missouri, Illinois, Ohio, Arkansas, and numerous other smaller rivers provides cost effective 
transport of large or bulky goods. The natural southward flow of water towards the Gulf of 
Mexico allowed efficient transportation even before the advent of motorized river vessels. 
Because of this readily available transport system, New Orleans, situated near the Mississippi 
River estuary, quickly developed into an epicenter of trade after its founding in 1718. Despite 
much change in the agriculture and transportation industries in the past three centuries, the 
Mississippi River System and the port of New Orleans still maintain their vital roles in moving 
U.S. crops from the field to markets around the world.  
Despite the importance of this system, relatively little work has been done investigating the 
use of barge freight forward contracts by grain elevators as a means of input price risk 
management. This study seeks to expand the literature on forward contracts in agriculture to 
include forward contracts issued by barge freight lines and barge freight brokers. These contracts 
allow a river elevator to lock in a freight price up to three months ahead of a shipping date by 
accepting posted offers. Unlike a traditional forward contract used by a farmer to lock in a sell 
price for an output, these barge freight forward contracts are essentially offers made by the seller 
of an input (transportation) which are accepted by the buyer (river elevator). Although the level 
of price risk associated with grain transportation is not as large as the price risk associated with 




bottom line. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that the price of barge freight on the 
Mississippi River System impacts local cash grain prices in markets reliant on the river system as 
an outlet for grain (McKenzie, 2005; Haigh and Bessler, 2004; Yu, Bessler, and Fuller, 2007). 
Knowing this, it is only logical to study the pricing patterns and characteristics of forward 
contracts for barge freight on the Mississippi River System.  
Prior studies, (e.g. Miller, 1986; Elam, 1992; Brorsen, Anderson, and Coombs, 1995; 
Townsend and Brorsen, 2000; Shi, 2007; Taylor, Tonsor, and Dhuyvetter, 2014; Mallory, Zhao, 
and Irwin, 2015) have focused attention on the cost of forward contracting from the perspective 
of farmers. The modal conclusions from this body of research are that: (1) farmers incur a cost 
from forward contracting in that they receive a lower price on elevator forward bids compared to 
elevator spot cash bids; and (2) that this cost is lower for shorter forward contract periods. 
Keynes (1930) explains that these costs of forward contracting are typically attributed to the risk-
management (hedging costs including margins and commissions) and administration costs 
incurred by elevators who take on the farmers’ price risk, an occurrence he described as 
“backwardation”. The markets which are the focus of these studies derive their value from 
physical assets, agricultural commodities. The barge freight market, which is the focus of this 
study, is based on the service of grain transportation rather than on an asset. Barge contracts 
reduce risk for the barge operator as well as the elevator so theory suggests that either party 
could end up paying a risk premium.  
There is also a body of work examining the characteristics of the now inactive BIFFEX 
(Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange) freight futures market. These studies range from 
unbiasedness tests to optimal hedge ratios and liquidity risk analysis. Kavussanos and Nomikos 




of subsequent ocean freight spot prices, three month out contracts had a significant bias resulting 
in a cost of forward contracting to the purchaser of the ocean freight. They do find, however, that 
even these biased three month out futures prices provided more accurate forecasts of subsequent 
spot prices than could be created using conventional econometric forecasting methods. Though 
this exchange was similar to the Mississippi River barge freight forward market in that they both 
provide price risk management tools for freight, there are distinct differences between the two. 
As the name suggests, the BIFFEX functioned as a futures market which allowed for the liquid 
trade and offsetting of contracts before maturity. While there is evidence that some Mississippi 
River barge freight forward contracts are offset before maturity1, there is no further evidence to 
believe that the Mississippi River barge freight market behaves as a futures market.  
We seek to determine whether or not there exists a cost of forward contracting within the 
Mississippi River System barge freight market. Furthermore, if a bias, or cost, is found to exist, 
we will specify its magnitude and which party (river elevators or barge freight lines) is 
responsible for this cost. This previously unexplored market offers a chance to employ 
techniques used in the past to analyze other markets to determine if a bias exists or if the market 
operates efficiently. We will explore the seasonality of forward contracting costs in this market 
and posit possible explanations for any seasonality that may exist. 
Following Townsend and Brorsen (2000), the costs of forward contracting in the 
Mississippi River System barge freight market is estimated using first differences.  The change 
in a forward bid from period d to period d+1 (one period closer to contract maturity) is 
                                               
1 Anecdotal accounts from Scoular employees actively trading in the Mississippi River market 
suggest that in some cases forward freight contracts can be exchanged for contracts with sooner 
delivery periods (with adjusted prices) and that some contracts may be cancelled before delivery 




calculated and the mean is found to determine whether a significant consistent bias exists in the 
bids over the life of the contract, which would indicate a cost to one party to use this market. To 
determine the statistical significance of the mean, two statistical tests are used: Student’s t test 
and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. This proposed approach is repeated for each of the eight 
locations within the Mississippi River System for which barge rates are reported in our dataset.  
Following empirical analysis to estimate the cost of forward contracting in this market, 
volume data are analyzed to draw conclusions on causality. Data displaying the number of up 
bound empty barges by month as well as barges unloaded in the port of New Orleans by month is 
graphically displayed to provide evidence of changing market conditions causing variation of 
forward contracting costs by season.  
Barge Freight Information 
For the purposes of this study, the vessel specified by the term “barge” is a covered, non-
self-propelled vessel used to transport grain along the Mississippi River System. When in transit, 
multiple barges are often lashed together into groups called a tow so that one tow boat (the self-
propelled vessel that pushes the barges) can move numerous barges at once. Depending on river 
conditions and direction of travel, as many as 40 barges can be moved by a single tow boat in 
this fashion. These vessels are typically 35 feet wide by 195 or 200 feet long, depending on 
whether it is a box or a rake barge. A rake barge, 195 feet long, has a sloped bow like a 
traditional boat which makes it more hydrodynamic during transit. Because of this, rake barges 
are placed at the front of a tow, and sometimes backwards at the rear of a tow, to make the tow 
easier to push through the water. A box barge, 200 feet long, is shaped like a rectangular prism. 
The box barge has a higher volume than a rake barge, but its flat front makes it suited only for 




 The barge hull height is typically 13 or 14 feet, with the interior container walls 
extending an additional 4 feet above the top of the hull. The amount of grain on a barge is 
determined by the draft depth of the barge. This refers to the distance between the surface of the 
water and the bottom of the hull, measured by subtracting the distance from the surface of the 
water to the top of the hull from the total height of the barge hull. Depending on river conditions, 
barges can be filled to different draft depths. For example, if the river is lower than normal, a 
barge may be required to have a draft depth of no more than 10 feet. This would be 
accomplished by putting less grain into the barge. When full, a barge can hold about 1,500 tons 
of grain, which is roughly 59,000 bushels of corn, and sits at a draft depth of 11 or 12 feet for 13 
or 14 foot tall barges, respectively.   
Barge freight rate quotes are issued in the form of percent of tariff. This is in reference to 
the original southbound rates, or tariffs, set in 1976 by the then Interstate Commerce 
Commission, which has since become a division within the United States Department of 
Transportation. These tariffs were set as a standard rate (dollars per ton) for transportation from a 
specified origin location to the New Orleans Gulf port. The tariffs for the most northern (farthest 
upstream) locations are highest, and the tariffs decrease as the location’s distance from New 
Orleans decreases. Today these tariffs are simply a benchmark for barge freight rate quotes 
which are reported as percent of tariff. For example, if the rate for barge transportation from 
Minneapolis is quoted as 200 (percent of tariff), given that the original tariff for Minneapolis is 




this study lists weekly percent of tariff quotes for three delivery periods for each of eight 
locations along the Mississippi River System.  
Figure 1. Barge travel time to port of New Orleans from river locations in days. 
Unlike other forms of grain transportation such as truck or rail, barge freight moves 
remarkably slow. A southbound loaded barge only moves at an average of 6 miles per hour, and 
with the vast expanse of area served by the Mississippi River system, moving grain in this 
manner can take as much as 21 days. Figure 1 shows the river locations included in this study 
along with the average travel time to the port of New Orleans (in days) for a grain barge. These 




(ACBL, 2010). Clearly, the duration of a shipment indicates that the firm providing the freight 
would benefit from having advanced notice of demand for their service. Particularly, for the 
farthest out locations such as Twin Cities, barge lines would need ample time to move empty 
barges and tow boats to the location to be loaded, and then will see those vessels engaged in that 
contract for nearly a month before they are available again. Accordingly, it follows that barge 
lines would want to incentivize forward contracting by their customers in order to better prepare 
for orders.  
The trading of barge freight is most commonly facilitated by a barge freight broker. 
Barge freight brokers on the Mississippi River System include McDonald Pelz, Ceres, and the 
Marine Freight Exchange, although others are active in the market. The actual barges are owned 
by barge lines who also work with these barge freight brokers in order to find buyers for their 
freight services. These barge freight line companies include Bunge, Cargill, Ingram Barge 
Company, American River Transportation Company (ARTCO), SEACOR, and Terral, among 
others. 
Literature Review of Barge Freight and Risk Premiums in Commodity Forward Markets 
 Although research into the implied costs of forward contracting barge freight on the 
Mississippi River System is limited, there is a significant body of work that has investigated the 
costs of forward contracting commodities in other markets. Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson 
(1993) and Townsend and Brorsen (2000) used empirical methods to estimate the risk premium 
involved with forward contracting wheat in Oklahoma. Both of these studies found a significant 
cost to farmers when using forward contracts to manage price risk instead of hedging using 
commodity futures contracts. Using the parametric model described above, Townsend and 




wheat 100 days prior to delivery with local elevators. Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson (1993) 
used a non-parametric model to find an average forward contracting cost for Oklahoma farmers 
of 7.00¢ per bushel. Both studies found that the cost of forward contracting increased as the 
length of the forward contract increased. In contrast to these results, Mallory, Zhao and Irwin 
(2015) found much smaller costs of post-harvest forward contracting for corn and soybeans 
although the pattern of increasing costs for increasing length of contract still held. Lewis, 
Manfredo, and Sanders (2015), in a study that differs from most existing literature on forward 
contracting, found that soybean oil processors do not embed a risk premium in their forward bids 
for soybeans. While Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson (1995), Townsend and Brorsen (2000), and 
Mallory, Zhao, and Irwin (2015) all used bids issued by elevators to suppliers of grain (e.g. 
farmers), Lewis, Manfredo, and Sanders (2015) analyzed forward asks (or offers) given by 
soybean oil processors to end-users purchasing the soybean oil. This is essentially the inverse of 
the traditional forward contracting market, however, this market structure more accurately 
matches the market structure of the Mississippi River barge freight forward market. These 
studies all seek to determine if a bias is present in the forward bids that creates a cost of forward 
contracting.  
McKenzie (2005) used an autoregressive model to determine the effect of barge rate 
shocks on internal basis levels in Arkansas’s delta region. The study showed that internal basis 
levels responded negatively to an increase in the barge rate. This suggests that at least some of 
the costs resulting from higher barge rates are passed to the farm level. As a result, if forward 
contracting costs are found and attributed to river elevators, this is only a preliminary assessment 




cause of shocks in barge rates. The model used shows that both soybean crush margin and 
financial costs of storage play a role in the movement of barge rates.  
Yu, Bessler, and Fuller (2007) also sought to determine the role of transportation in 
determining inland cash corn prices. They found that the gulf export market accounts for 26-42% 
of variation in inland corn prices, while grain transportation costs account for as much as 42-64% 
of variation in inland grain prices. The biggest contributing factor to the variation caused by 
transportation costs was variance in ocean vessel rates. Barge rates and rail rates were next, with 
the variation in barge rates explaining 10-13% of variation of inland corn cash prices in the long 
run.  
Haigh and Bessler (2004), in a similar vein to McKenzie (2005) and Yu, Bessler, and 
Fuller (2007), used a cointegration model along with directed acyclic graphs to determine the 
causal path of information among the gulf export market, Illinois inland grain markets, and 
volatile barge freight markets. The study found that the gulf market does have a significant effect 
on Illinois grain markets. However, contrary to similar studies, they found that in the long run it 
is inland grain prices that influence barge rates, as opposed to barge rates influencing inland 
grain prices. They conclude that both inland grain prices as well as the gulf export market 
influence barge rates in the long run.  
This literature on barge market impacts on grain markets (Haigh and Bessler, 2004; 
McKenzie, 2005; Yu, Bessler, and Fuller, 2007) all emphasize the important role of the barge 
market in the U.S. grain industry. These studies show that barge rates are large enough to 
influence storage decisions as well as decisions on which market a firm will sell in (local or 
gulf). Given this important role, further research into forward pricing of barge rates on the 




Modeling and Testing for Bias 
The data used for this study are from United States Department of Agriculture 
Agricultural Marketing Service grain transportation report datasets available publicly online 
(USDA, 2017). The dataset contains weekly offers for barge freight to the port of New Orleans 
from eight locations on the Mississippi River system: Twin Cities, Mid-Mississippi, Lower 
Illinois River, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Lower Ohio River, Cairo-Memphis, and Memphis-South. 
These offers are for this week (spot price), 1-month out, and 3-month out forward delivery 
periods. The sample period is from January 1, 2004 to October 28, 2015. However, for the Twin 
Cities location, no 3-month out bids were recorded for September, October, November, and 
December. This is likely due to freezing conditions closing the river to barge navigation.  Also 
retrieved from the USDA AMS website is the number of barges unloaded at the port of New 
Orleans by month, as well as the number of up bound empty grain barges by month. These data 
are for the same time period as the barge rate data and are used as evidence to justify 
explanations of patterns found in the initial results.   
This study will approach the empirical analysis of barge freight rates with a logarithmic 
first differences model. This begins by taking the natural log of each observed barge rate quote:  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡
𝑙,𝑑 =  ln(𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑡
𝑙,𝑑). 
Where the natural log of a barge rate quote for delivery period d at location l reported on day t 
creates the variable Log Rate. Then, first differences are taken by subtracting Log Ratet-1 from 
Log Ratet: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 =  𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡
𝑙,𝑑 −  𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1
𝑙,𝑑
. 
This difference represents the daily percent change in barge rate quotes. To account for 




rates. This is done by subtracting the first day of the 3 month out delivery period from the last 
day of the 1 month out delivery period: 
𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙,3,1 = 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑡
𝑙,1 − 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑡−4
𝑙,3
. 
This same process is repeated to find the rollover between the one month out delivery and 
the spot price. To find the average cost of forward contracting for a given delivery period, the 
mean of the first differences for a given location and delivery period is found, representing the 
average weekly percent change in barge rate bids. Because the natural log of levels rather than 
the levels themselves are used in the first differences model, the results can be interpreted as the 
weekly percent change in barge rates. To interpret results in terms of the original units of the data 
(percent of tariff) an exponential transformation is performed for each location and delivery 
period: 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑙,𝑑 = 𝑒𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑙,𝑑
. 
Because the sign of the mean log first differences is critical to interpreting which party to 
the transaction incurs a potential cost of forward contracting, the sign from the mean log first 
differences model is attributed to the resulting average change in percent of tariff. For instance, if 
the average change in percent of tariff is negative, this implies a cost to the buyer of the barge 
freight because they accepted a forward price for an input that was higher than what the 
subsequent spot price ended up being at the time of deliver. Conversely, a positive sign 
represents the freight price increasing from the time a forward offer is made to the time of 
delivery, and therefore the cost of forward contracting is placed upon the seller of the barge 
freight. This same average process and attribution of sign is repeated for the two rollover 
variables. From here, the average change in percent of tariff is used to calculate the total cost of 




multiplying the average change in percent of tariff for a given delivery period by a standard four 
weeks which occur within that given delivery period (a delivery period being a standard calendar 
month) and then adding this result to any subsequent delivery period results and rollovers. 
Following this method, the total cost of forward contracting for a given location, l, for a delivery 
period three months in the future can be calculated as: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙,3
= (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑙,3 ∗ 4) + 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙,3,1
+ (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑙,1 ∗ 4) + 𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙,1,0. 
This cost of forward contracting, in units of percent of tariff, can then be multiplied by 
the 1976 benchmark tariff for the specified river location to transform it into dollars per ton. 
Ultimately, the cost in cents per bushel can be found by dividing this dollars per ton figure by 
2000 and then multiplying by the number of pounds per bushel2. For our study, this cost per 
bushel is often very small (around one cent per bushel), however, when transformed into dollars 
per barge3 the cost appears much more substantial.  
In order to study the effects of seasonality on the potential costs of forward contracting, 
the data is segregated into seasons based on the month of the delivery period. The seasons used 
for this study are the three basic seasons of the grain production cycle. Season 1 (January 
through April) represents the storage season, season 2 (May through August) represents the 
growing season, and season 3 (September through December) represents the harvest season. 
These seasons were selected in an attempt to segregate the data based on differing demand for 
barge freight.  
                                               
2 A standard U.S. bushel of corn weighs 56 pounds, while a bushel of soybeans or wheat weighs 
60 pounds.  




Results and Analysis 
For the purpose of conciseness, we will discuss the results as costs in terms of dollars per 
barge based on a corn barge (56 pounds per bushel). It is also important to remember that a 
negative number represents a cost to the river elevator (buyer), while a positive cost represents a 
cost to the barge line (seller). Perhaps the most interesting result from our model is the variation 
of forward contracting costs based on the season of delivery. As seen in table 1, the Twin Cities 
location shows positive costs for all three seasons, with costs of $9.22, $979.86, and $390.50 for 
seasons 1, 2, and 3, respectively. For this far north location on the Mississippi River, the offers 
seem to incentivize forward contracting over purchasing freight in the spot market from the 
perspective of freight buyers during all seasons of the year. With exception of the Twin Cities 
location, the results all follow the pattern of having a cost to the barge line for forward 
contracting during the summer season (season 2) and a cost of forward contracting to the river 
elevators during the harvest and winter season (seasons 1 and 3). Beginning with the Mid-
Mississippi River location, table 1 shows costs of -$485.34, $679.28, and -$475.12 for seasons 1, 
2, and 3, respectively. The lower Illinois River location shows costs of forward contracting of -
$484.04, $511.22, and -$353.45 for seasons 1, 2, and 3. The St. Louis location shows costs of 
forward contracting of -$697.39, $460.34, and -$404.74 for seasons 1, 2, and 3. The Cincinnati 
location on the Ohio River has costs of forward contracting of -$705.75, $466.89, and -$412.56 
for seasons 1, 2, and 3. The lower Ohio River location has costs of forward contracting of -
$670.72, $443.82, and $392.38 for seasons 1, 2, and 3. The Cairo-Memphis section of the 
Mississippi River has costs of forward contracting of -$87.10, $313.96, and -$273.79 for seasons 
1, 2, and 3. The final location, Memphis-South has costs of forward contracting of -$87.06, 




there does not appear to be a systematic pattern in forward contracting costs based on 
geographical location. However, a seasonal pattern does present itself in the form of negative 
costs of forward contracting (costs to buyers of freight) during seasons 1 and 3 and a positive 
cost of forward contracting (cost to the seller of freight) for season 2.  This pattern lends support 
to our selection of seasonal periods and also to the examination of seasonal effects.  
One logical explanation for the contrasting results coming from the Twin Cities location 
is the geographic characteristics of that location. Being the location furthest from the port of New 
Orleans, it makes sense that a barge line would want forward notice of the demand for barges at 
this location, as there is no instance in which barges would happen to be passing through this 
location on their way to other locations. If enough forewarning is given for the need of barges at 
this location, the barge line could consolidate barges into one large tow and make fewer trips to 
this far north location rather than make many trips with fewer barges in each tow. Barge lines 
making forward offers may provide consistently lower forward bids than spot bids in an effort to 
incentivize forward contracting so that they can capitalize on this opportunity to reduce their own 
operating costs.  
One potential explanation for seasonal patterns observed at other locations is a 
combination of seasonal volume and the logistical characteristics of the barge freight market. 
Conversations with operations managers working for The Scoular Company at a barge loading 
facility revealed that it is common practice for barge lines to move large tows of barges upstream 
at the beginning of the harvest season in expectation of increased demand for barge freight in the 
spot market. This suggests that during times of peak volume, barge lines are already minimizing 
operating costs by moving the maximum number of barges at a time upstream in each tow. 




offering lower forward prices in relation to subsequent spot prices. Moreover, because these 
forward contracts serve a price risk transference role, the barge lines can extract a risk premium 
from the market, in the form of higher forward prices in relation to the subsequent spot prices, as 
compensation for their acceptance of the river elevators’ risk. However, during lower volume 
periods, such as season 2, the barge lines do not take these proactive steps to accumulate barges 
upstream for anticipated use in the spot market. Therefore, it again follows that they should 
incentivize the forward contracting of barge freight by river elevators through lower forward 
prices, as is seen in all seasons of the Twin Cities location.  
Barge movement data also retrieved from the USDA AMS (USDA, 2017) website 
supports the theory that seasonal volume contributes to the pattern of changing forward 
contracting costs in the barge freight forward market. Monthly averages for the time period 
matching the barge freight rate data reveals that more grain barges are unloaded at the port of 
New Orleans during seasons 1 and 3 than in season 2 (Figure 2). It follows that barge freight 
lines and barge freight brokers extract a risk premium during times of high demand through 
offering forward prices consistently higher than the subsequent spot prices for barge freight. 
Likewise, during times of low demand, this cost of forward contracting is not only reduced, but 
reverses to become a cost to the seller of the barge freight.  
Data retrieved from the same source (USDA, 2017) showing the volume of northbound 
empty barges, displayed in figure 3, also lends support to our theory of varying costs of forward 
contracting being due to seasonal barge movement patterns. The data shows that the number of 
northbound empty barges is highest during the summer months (March through July) with an 
average of 582 barges moved north per month, then sharply decreases as harvest begins (August, 




barges jumps back up during November and December (583 barges per month), then falls again 
for January and February (479 barges per month). This pattern resembles an inverse of the 
monthly average data for barges unloaded at the port of New Orleans. The logical conclusion 
from this relationship is that barge freight lines do accumulate empty barges upstream in 
preparation for high demand periods, and that during these high demand periods, fewer empty 
barges are moved upstream, likely due to a majority of tugs being used to move barges 
southbound.  
As figure 4 shows, the cost of forward contracting in the Mississippi River barge freight 
market is highly seasonal. Graphically analyzing the average total cost by month across all eight 
locations shows that the seasonal breaks used in the analysis generally hold. This is expected 
based on the seasonal nature of the agricultural commodities being shipped inside the barges. 
Figure 5 further supports the seasonal breaks used in this analysis, as season 3 is distinctly shown 




























Season Spot Price 1 Month             
Rollover 
1 Month Out 3-1 Month 
Rollover 
3 Months Out 
Twin Cities 1 -0.0125** -0.0253 -0.0133^^*** 0.0119 0.0017 
2 0.0160^^* 0.0134 0.0296^^^*** 0.0341^** 0.0273^^^*** 




1 -0.0317^^^*** 0.0013 -0.0141^^** 0.0027 -0.0041* 
2 0.0268^^^*** -0.0026 0.0394^^^*** 0.0102 0.0289^^^*** 
3 -0.0009 0.0253 -0.0099 0.0825^** -0.0126* 
Lower 
Illinois River 
1 -0.0221^^*** 0.0015 -0.0188^^^*** -0.0287 -0.0045 
2 0.0315^^^*** -0.0101 0.0439^^^*** 0.0140 0.0286^^^*** 
3 -0.0061 0.0408 -0.0200^^** 0.0469^ -0.0199^^^*** 
St. Louis 1 -0.0250^^** -0.0092 -0.0203^^*** -0.0702^^** -0.0210 
2 0.0514^^^*** -0.0481^^** 0.0633^^^*** -0.0016 0.0325^^^*** 
3 -0.0237 0.0463 -0.0398^^^*** 0.0249 -0.0271^^^*** 
Cincinnati  1 -0.0264^^^*** -0.0208 -0.0233^^^*** -0.0898^^*** -0.0075** 
2 0.0490^^^*** -0.0589^^*** 0.0597^^^*** -0.0147 0.0359^^^*** 
3 -0.0184 0.0277 -0.0331^^^*** 0.0322 -0.0245^^^*** 
Lower Ohio 
River 
1 -0.0262^^^*** -0.0172 -0.0235*** -0.0988^^^*** -0.0077** 
2 0.0489^^^*** -0.0650^^*** 0.0598^^^*** -0.0060 0.0359^^^*** 
3 -0.0185 0.0272 -0.0330^^^*** 0.0330 -0.0243^^^*** 
Cairo-
Memphis 
1 -0.0204^^*** -0.0374 -0.0167^^** -0.0899^^^*** 0.0025 
2 0.0583^^^*** -0.0782^^^*** 0.0684^^^*** -0.0079 0.0311^^*** 
3 -0.0364^^** 0.0129 -0.0472^^^*** 0.0135 -0.0323^^^*** 
Memphis-
South 
1 -0.0193** -0.0366 -0.0165^** -0.0906^^^*** 0.0029 
2 0.0560^^^*** -0.0590^^** 0.0670^^^*** 0.0026 0.0299^^*** 
3 0.0337^** 0.0170 -0.0476^^^*** 0.0221 -0.0307^^^*** 
^, ^^, and ^^^ denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively, by student’s t test. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively, by Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. 
†No data was available for three month out bids at the Twin Cities location for season three, likely due to frozen river 
conditions 






















Season Benchmark Tariff 
($/ton) 
Average Cost of Forward 
Contracting ($/ton) 
$/barge corn 
Twin Cities 1  $          6.19   $       0.01   $       9.22  
2  $          6.19   $       0.64   $   979.86  
3  $          6.19   $       0.25   $   390.50  
Mid-Mississippi 
River 
1  $          5.32  $      (0.32)  $ (485.34) 
2  $          5.32   $       0.44   $   679.28  
3  $          5.32   $      (0.31)  $ (475.12) 
Lower Illinois River 1  $          3.99   $      (0.31)  $ (484.04) 
2  $          3.99   $       0.33   $   511.22  
3  $          3.99   $      (0.23)  $ (353.45) 
St. Louis 1  $          4.64   $      (0.45)  $ (697.39) 
2  $          4.64   $       0.30   $   460.34  
3  $          4.64   $      (0.26)  $ (404.74) 
Cincinnati  1  $          4.69   $      (0.46)  $ (705.75) 
2  $          4.69   $       0.30   $   466.89  
3  $          4.69   $      (0.27)  $ (412.56) 
Lower Ohio River 1  $          4.46   $      (0.44)  $ (670.72) 
2  $          4.46   $       0.29   $   443.82  
3  $          4.46   $      (0.25)  $ (392.38) 
Cairo-Memphis 1  $          3.14   $      (0.06)  $   (87.10) 
2  $          3.14   $       0.20   $   313.96  
3  $          3.14   $      (0.18)  $ (273.79) 
Memphis-South 1  $          3.14   $      (0.06)  $   (87.06) 
2  $          3.14   $       0.27   $   409.02  
3  $          3.14   $      (0.18)  $ (273.39) 




Figure 2. Average number of grain barges unloaded at the port of New Orleans by month. 
 




















































































































































































This study adds to the existing literature on forward contracting costs by expanding the 
subject to include the forward contracting of a service, barge freight. Most forward contracts in 
agriculture deal with the sale/purchase of commodities, which are assets. The literature on 
forward contracting agricultural commodities mostly shows a significant cost of forward 
contracting for longer periods of time, with the seller incurring the cost. As the results of our 
study show, there are also significant costs of forward contracting in the barge freight forward 
market. However, we discovered that the party incurring these costs in the barge freight forward 
market varies depending on the season. The reason for this drastic swing in forward contracting 
costs based on season is likely due to the market’s dependence on agricultural growing seasons 
for demand, as well as supply restrictions based on seasonal weather patterns.  
What these results mean for participants in this market is that strictly in terms of 
minimizing average costs, forward contracting barge freight during low demand periods (season 
2) can result in transportation prices lower than what they would have been had freight been 
purchased in the spot market as needed. Conversely, during periods of high demand (seasons 1 
and 3) forward contracting barge freight will result in freight prices higher than what could have 
been purchased in the spot market at the time of shipment. Knowing this, on average a grain firm 
using barge freight to transport grain should forward contract freight for shipments made during 
season 3, but purchase freight in the spot market as needed for seasons 1 and 3 to minimize their 
transportation costs. However, it is important to consider the price risk management function that 
this market serves. For instance, although in the long run this outlined strategy should minimize 
transportation costs, not forward contracting barge freight leaves firms exposed to barge freight 




transportation costs some years, but higher transportation costs during other years could cause 
cash flow or liquidity problems. Given this, if the cost of forward contracting is reasonably 
small, barge freight purchasers might still elect to forward contract, knowingly paying the cost 
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III. The Cost of Forward Contracting in CIF NOLA Export Bid Market 
Introduction 
The CIF NOLA (cost of insurance and freight to the port of New Orleans) export bid 
market functions in manner unique among other agricultural forward markets. Prior studies, (e.g. 
Miller, 1986; Elam, 1992; Brorsen, Anderson, and Coombs, 1995; Townsend and Brorsen, 2000; 
Shi, 2007; Taylor, Tonsor, and Dhuyvetter, 2014; Mallory, Zhao, and Irwin, 2015) have focused 
attention on the cost of forward contracting from the perspective of farmers. The modal 
conclusions from this body of research are that: (1) farmers incur a cost from forward contracting 
in that they receive a lower price on elevator forward bids compared to elevator spot cash bids; 
and (2) that this cost is lower for shorter forward contract periods. Keynes (1930) explains that 
these costs of forward contracting are typically attributed to the risk-management (hedging costs 
including margins and commissions) and administration costs incurred by elevators who take on 
the farmers’ price risk, an occurrence he described as “backwardation”.  In contrast, the futures 
market efficiency literature concludes that in the long run, grain futures provide efficient and 
unbiased forecasts of subsequent spot cash prices at delivery time (e.g. McKenzie and Holt, 
2002), which implicitly indicates that farmers do not consistently incur similar forward 
contracting costs when hedging. Similarly, Kolb and Gay (1983) found no significant bias in live 
cattle futures prices, indicating that live cattle futures perform well as predictors of subsequent 
spot prices. Futures markets allow traders to cheaply offset or re-trade contracts and this quickly 
eliminates pricing biases.  
Given the hybrid forward-futures nature of the CIF NOLA market, which serves the 
“merchandising” sector of the grain industry, it is not clear as to whether forward contracting 




incur the cost. While the markets play the traditional forward contracting role of delivering 
physical cash grain, the fact that contracts can be re-traded and that there are both long and short 
hedgers, might help to remove forward contracting costs akin to a traditional futures market. This 
is ultimately an empirical question, which we seek to answer. 
Our results will provide interesting insights as to the potential existence – or absence – of 
forward contracting costs in a previously unexamined hybrid forward-futures market. We will be 
able to say who bears these potential costs, river elevators and terminals or Gulf exporters, and to 
what extent these potential costs differ by delivery period. For the purposes of our study, we 
define a bias in forward bids as a consistent difference between a forward basis bid for a given 
delivery period, and the subsequent spot basis level at the time of delivery. Unlike McKenzie and 
Holt (2002) who tested the accuracy of futures prices as forecasts for prices, we assume that any 
bias in CIF NOLA forward bids is not the result of inaccurate forecasts. Therefore, any bias 
found, which could be either positive or negative, represents what we refer to as a “risk 
premium” or cost of forward contracting.   
Following Townsend and Brorsen (2000), the costs of forward contracting in the CIF 
NOLA market are estimated by a parametric model using first differences.  The change in a 
forward bid from period d to period d-1 (one period further to contract maturity) is calculated 
and the mean is found to determine if a bias exists in the bids over the life of the contract which 
would indicate a cost to one party to use this market. A positive value would indicate a cost to 
buyers, while a negative cost would indicate a cost to sellers. To determine the statistical 
significance of the mean, three statistical tests are used: Student’s t test, sign test, and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. The estimates are then extrapolated over the total time period for each delivery 




and Brorsen (2000), a market day calendar (5 day week) is used to find total forward contracting 
costs over the life of a given CIF NOLA forward contract.  
Section 2 of this study will define the characteristics of the CIF NOLA forward contract 
market and present background literature relevant to estimating the cost of forward contracting, 
the market actions that create efficiency. Section 3 will address the modeling used to calculate a 
potential cost of forward contracting, or bias, in the market discussed. Section 4 will present the 
data collected and used in this study, along with providing model estimates and an objective list 
of empirical results. Finally, in section 5 the results and conclusions from this study will be 
presented along with the study’s contribution to relevant literature and impact on future research.  
Institutional Details of CIF NOLA market  
The CIF NOLA market is a hybrid futures/forward contract market used by elevators and 
exporters along the Mississippi River. The unique attributes of this market that create this hybrid 
environment are the dual roles it plays in the grain industry. Although, it is primarily used to 
trade physical cash grain for export it also serves as a liquid “paper market” to hedge the sales 
and purchases of large and small grain firms (e.g. elevators). For example, a number of major 
grain exporters ship grain from the Gulf and post daily CIF bids for spot and forward delivery 
periods as far as six months out. They include Cargill, ADM, Bunge, CHS and Zennoh to name a 
few, and this along with the fact that CIF brokers offer bids and asks for Gulf delivered grain, 
makes a liquid market. We have two forms of supporting evidence to back up our claim that 
firms make offers as well as bids. We were given access to six Scoular bid sheets dated over the 
last couple of years that are circulated internally on a daily basis among key employees who 
trade the River Market. Although we cannot share this data as it is proprietary, it shows that 




cents/bu (widest 10), wheat spreads around 12 cents/bu (widest 20 cents), and sorghum spreads if 
they exist can be very wide – up to 30 cents/bu (average 13 cents/bu). Our second piece of 
evidence comes from a Platt’s pricing newsletter which contains similar numbers for bid-ask 
spreads. This newsletter is available through Platt’s subscription service on their website.   
First, with respect to its forward contracting role, cash grain that is originated by 
elevators in production regions is sold and physically delivered by barges on the Mississippi 
river to exporters on the Gulf coast. The country elevators either sell grain directly to Gulf 
exporters or sell to river terminals owned by large grain merchandising firms who subsequently 
sell the grain to Gulf exporters. The large grain merchandising firms may also be Gulf exporters 
and depending upon market circumstances can be buyers or sellers of grain destined for Gulf 
export. The demand for CIF NOLA grain is driven by foreign demand for U.S. grain exports. 
Each CIF NOLA contract stipulates the delivery of a barge load of grain (55,000 bushels) to the 
port of New Orleans by the specified date, and that the cost of transportation and insuring the 
cargo through shipment must be covered by the seller of the grain, as indicated by the term CIF 
(cost of insurance and freight). A firm that sells a CIF NOLA contract for a forward delivery 
period is committing to deliver 55,000 bushels of grain on a barge to the Gulf, while conversely 
the buyer of the contract must accept delivery of the barge transported grain. Firms that have 
sold CIF NOLA contracted grain can purchase the barge freight either directly from barge lines 
or through CIF freight brokers and freight can be bought in the spot market or forward contracted 
for a future delivery period. Thus, similar to the price risk of CIF NOLA contracted grain, the 
price risk of the freight can be mitigated by forward contracts. The delivery dates specified in 
CIF NOLA contracts are months, where delivery must occur by the end of the month specified. 




delivery period. Once loaded, the seller “applies the barge” to the buyer. Then the seller 
“releases” the barge to a barge line (a firm that owns barges) which transports the grain to the 
Gulf. When the buyer takes possession of the grain it is officially weighed by the Federal Grain 
Inspection Service and any weight and quality discounts are applied to the final billing invoice. 
All legal contractual obligations and trade rules in the CIF NOLA market are governed by the 
National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA) and the NGFA administers an arbitration process 
for contractual disputes between parties. The price of CIF NOLA contracts are determined 
through the traditional bid/ask system where sellers of grain ask for a certain basis (price), and 
export elevators bid a certain basis (price), and through the process of price discovery, the 
market clearing price is determined. Transactions can occur directly between firms or through a 
CIF broker who matches buyers and sellers in a liquid OTC market. 
Traditional forward markets for grain, such as those between farmers and elevators are 
associated with risk premiums, where it is assumed that elevators typically require a risk-
premium from farmers to contract pre-harvest grain for harvest delivery.  As noted earlier, this 
risk premium manifests itself in the form of lower prices on elevator forward bids compared with 
elevator spot cash bids, and is larger for longer delivery periods. Therefore, a priori, one might 
expect, given its forward contracting role, that the CIF NOLA market may also contain risk 
premia. In this case, grain exporting firms who purchase grain on CIF NOLA may require a 
similar risk premium from firms selling grain for Gulf delivery. Specifically, under this 
assumption, one would observe lower forward CIF NOLA bids compared with the associated 
CIF NOLA spot bids for the same delivery dates, which would be subsequently observed at 
contract maturity. Akin to the farmer-elevator case, the longer the forward delivery bid the 




While Nelson (1985) stresses the importance of differentiating forward and futures 
contracts, the CIF NOLA forward market seems to draw characteristics from both, given its 
second important role – that of a “paper hedging market” akin to an exchange traded futures 
market. Therefore, it is not clear that the CIF NOLA market should contain risk premia, as 
hedgers are able to take both long and short positions.  Importantly, because CIF brokers provide 
an over-the-counter (OTC) platform where both bids and asks (offers) are traded between 
merchandising firms – both exporters and elevators – hedging demand may be balanced between 
long and short positions. Indeed it is not uncommon for a firm to take both a long and a short 
offsetting basis position in a single CIF contract at different times over the contract’s life. 
Importantly, the CIF forward market is structurally different than other agricultural forward 
markets where market agents are clearly separated in terms of their marketing objectives and 
risks. For example, in the farmer-elevator forward market, there are two distinct groups of 
market agents (e.g. farmers sell grain forward while elevators buy grain forward). In contrast the 
CIF NOLA market serves market agents – namely merchandising firms – who may be both 
buyers and sellers of grain. In addition, merchandising firms may use the CIF NOLA market to 
trade basis. As basis traders, these firms seek to profit from advantageous changes in basis by 
buying basis at relatively low levels and selling it at relatively high levels. Firms engaged in this 
marketing strategy inherently take on basis risk rather than trying to minimize basis risk, and 
therefore risk premiums may not be a feature of the CIF NOLA market. With this in mind, it is 
useful to consider the mechanics of how this “paper market” works and how grain firms use it to 
basis trade and hedge existing or expected grain sales and purchases.  Akin to trading physical 
barges, a firm that is trading in the paper market and initially sells a CIF NOLA contract for a 




Likewise, the firm that buys the CIF NOLA contract is obligated to take delivery of the grain by 
unloading the barge during the delivery period. However, similar to an exchange traded futures 
contract either the initial seller or buyer can remove their physical cash commitments by taking  
offsetting positions prior to the delivery period. Each time an offsetting contract 
transaction takes place the obligations of the initial seller (buyer) are passed on to the other buyer 
(seller) in the trade. Each party to each trade is recorded by paperwork on what is referred to as a 
“Bill of Lading,” which also includes information regarding the quantity, the type of commodity, 
and its final destination. In this way, there can be numerous offsetting transactions with multiple 
sellers and buyers that form a “paper chain” for a single CIF NOLA contract. You can have a 
single 55,000 bushel barge contract that trades over a million bushels of paper transactions. 
Ultimately, the final seller of the contract and the final buyer of the contract are obligated to 
make and take delivery of the physical barge at contract delivery. Figure 1 illustrates the 
contractual obligations of CIF NOLA traders and how contracts are offset in the “paper market”. 
Note that although a four party example is illustrated, there can be many more firms or agents 
involved in the paper chain of a CIF NOLA transaction. 














Buy $4.30 $4.40  $4.50 
Sell $4.40 $4.50 $4.30  
Receipts $242,000 $247,500 $236,500  
(Payments) ($236,500) ($242,000)  ($247,500) 
Net Profit 
(loss) 




For this example, we assume that the futures contract associated with this CIF NOLA 
forward transaction is trading at $4.00 per bushel. It is common for CIF NOLA basis bids to be 
positive, creating prices above futures prices. Note that the payments and receipts shown in 
Table 1 for river elevator 2 is representative of the sell price of $4.30 multiplied by the 55,000 
bushels specified in a CIF NOLA contract. River elevator 2 would have purchased the 55,000 
bushels of cash grain from either producers or other elevators prior to shipment, and these 
transactions are not shown in this illustration. Similarly, the payment of gulf export elevator 2 is 
representative of $4.50 buy price multiplied by 55,000 bushels. It is also worth noting that river 
elevators and gulf export elevators have the ability to take either a short or long position, or both, 
in this market and often do. 
When the contract enters the delivery time slot the final contract seller in the chain 
“applies the barge” to the final contract buyer and all financial payments and receipts are passed 
along to each seller and buyer in the paper chain. There are some notable differences between 
grain futures contracts and CIF NOLA contracts. For example, unlike futures contracts, where 
Figure 1. CIF NOLA market example 
Note: Although this example uses prices for simplicity, CIF NOLA bids and offers are traded 





trades are anonymous and clearinghouses record transactions between buyers and sellers, each 
party is known to each other in the CIF NOLA paper market. Also, in the CIF NOLA market 
there is no margin accounting system to guarantee financial risks associated with contract 
performance. Although there can be many offsetting trades associated with a single CIF NOLA 
contract, as with traditional forward markets there is counterparty risk embedded in a contract 
and this risk may manifest itself in the form of risk-premia.  Ultimately this is an empirical 
question. 
To better understand why merchandising firms may take both long and short CIF NOLA 
contract positions, we turn attention to their basis trading and hedging motivations by illustrating 
some specific examples. Market integration ensures that the basis (difference) between the CIF 
NOLA basis and the basis in interior grain markets is fairly stable. In other words, basis 
movements in CIF NOLA market are correlated with basis movements in interior grain markets. 
There is empirical evidence to show that basis shocks at CIF NOLA lead to basis movements in 
interior markets of similar magnitude and direction (e.g. McKenzie, 2005). The extent to which 
this form of price discovery and transmission takes place in terms of size and duration will 
depend upon the degree of market integration and barriers to commodity arbitrage. Anecdotally, 
industry conversations indicate that at least some elevators gauge the competitiveness of basis 
bids and offers in their local market in comparison to transportation cost adjusted bids in CIF 
NOLA market. This is referred to “FOBing” bids in the grain industry, where FOB is freight on 
board bid.  
First, consider a country elevator in Missouri that wants to sell grain and make a basis 
sale. However, currently basis is at low and unprofitable levels in the elevator’s local spot market 




CIF NOLA market spikes up because of higher export demand, even if the Missouri based 
elevator does not physically trade the river market, it can use the CIF NOLA market to make a 
“paper sale” of grain and lock in a relatively high sell basis for a forward delivery period using 
the following equation: 
   𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐼𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑡+𝑛 = 𝐶𝐼𝐹 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑡+𝑛 + 𝐸𝑡
𝑡+𝑛 
(𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐶𝐼𝐹 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝑛). 
The lock-in sell basis for an elevator’s local market, i, locked in at the current time 
period, t, for some delivery period in the future, t+n, equals the CIF basis bid posted in the 
current time period, t, for the future period, t+n, plus the expectation operator, E.  This 
expectation operator represents the expectation of what the difference between commodities 
futures basis for the local market, i, and the CIF basis spot bid will be at future period t+n. This 
equation mimics the process a farmer would undertake when hedging pre-harvest using futures 
contracts to lock in a sell price. For this example, however, the role of a futures contract is filled 
by CIF NOLA forward basis bids. So, the sell basis level that the elevator is attempting to lock in 
is equal to the current CIF basis bid for desired delivery period, plus the current expectation of 
what basis between the local market and the CIF market will be at the time of delivery. 
Commodity arbitrage will ensure that the CIF NOLA basis and the Missouri basis cannot diverge 
by an amount greater than transportation costs between the two markets for any length of time. 
There is a vast commodity market integration literature using cointegration analysis (e.g. 
Goodwin and Piggott, 2001) to show that market prices are correlated through space and time. 
Therefore, in a similar vein to a farmer using the futures market to make a profitable sale of grain 
through short-hedging, the Missouri-based elevator in our example can use the CIF NOLA paper 




back at a later date when it sells grain in his local market and the difference between its local 
basis and CIF NOLA basis has returned to a normal pre-shock level. 
Literature Review of Risk Premiums in Commodity Forward and Futures Markets 
There is a sizeable body of work investigating the costs associated with using various 
types of forward contracts in agriculture. McKenzie and Holt (2002) analyzed the efficiency of 
live cattle, hog, corn, and soybean meal futures. They determined that while short-run 
inefficiencies and pricing biases do exist in live cattle, hogs, and corn futures contracts, in the 
long-run, futures contracts provide unbiased estimates of subsequent spot cash prices. The results 
for corn and soybean meal found that no risk premium is associated with their use, however, they 
found evidence of time-varying risk premiums in live cattle and hog futures markets in the short-
run. Kolb and Gay (1983) found no significant bias in live cattle futures prices, indicating that 
live cattle futures perform well as predictors of subsequent spot prices. 
Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson (1995) and Townsend and Brorsen (2000) both found an 
inherent cost associated with the use of forward contracts as a risk management tool for wheat 
producers. Using a parametric model, Townsend and Brorsen (2000) found that Oklahoma 
farmers forward contracting wheat 100 days pre-harvest using local elevator bids paid a risk 
premium of 6¢ per bushel for the service. Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson (1995), also using a 
parametric model, found that forward contracting wheat using Gulf forward basis bids four 
months out incurs an average cost of 4¢ per bushel.  In a similar vein, Mallory, Zhao, and Irwin 
(2015) found a risk premium associated with post-harvest forward contracting corn and soybeans 
of 6¢ and 2¢ per bushel, respectively, using local elevator bids from throughout Illinois. Lewis, 
Manfredo, and Sanders (2015), in a study that differs from most existing literature on forward 




for soybeans. While Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson (1995), Townsend and Brorsen (2000), and 
Mallory, Zhao, and Irwin (2015) all used bids issued by elevators to suppliers of grain, Lewis, 
Manfredo, and Sanders (2015) analyzed forward asks (or offers) given by soybean oil processors 
to end-users purchasing the soybean oil. This is essentially the inverse of the traditional forward 
contracting market. These studies all seek to determine if a bias is present in the forward bids 
that creates a cost of forward contracting.  
Our hypothesis that the CIF NOLA market serves a price discovery and hedging role for 
inland grain markets relies on the assumption that CIF NOLA basis levels are correlated with 
inland basis levels. Goodwin and Piggott (2001) found that even in spatially separated markets 
with significant transaction costs, there is still strong evidence of integration. Their analysis 
describes the process of market integration in the presence of unobservable transaction costs, 
finding that accounting for these cost through the use of thresholds results in a faster response to 
shocks in comparison to earlier non-threshold models. It is likely that unobservable transaction 
costs are a characteristic of the CIF NOLA forward market, as brokers extract fees, and there are 
costs associated with the loading of barges. McKenzie (2005) applies a cointegration model to 
the price discovery effect of both gulf soybean basis bids and barge rate levels on internal 
soybean basis levels. This study emphasizes the importance of analyzing commodity markets in 
terms of basis, given that basis is the accepted means by which grain is traded within the 
industry. The conclusions of the study are that gulf basis bids for soybeans are positively 
correlated with inland soybean basis levels, specifically basis levels in Memphis and Little Rock. 
Also that these inland basis levels are negatively correlated with barge rates for transportation to 




deviate from CIF NOLA basis levels beyond transportation costs (or unobservable transaction 
costs) in the long run. 
This study seeks to extend the work of Townsend and Brorsen (2000) by extending their 
analysis of forward contracts to the data set created from CIF NOLA bids. We have found no 
known studies analyzing the efficiency of the CIF NOLA market.  
Modeling and Testing for Bias 
The data used for this study were collected from USDA AMS daily gulf export bid 
reports (Davila, 2016). The data consists of daily basis bids for corn, soybeans, soft red winter 
wheat, and sorghum delivered to New Orleans. Bids are recorded for five delivery periods: spot 
price, or immediate delivery, one month out, two months out, three months out, and four months 
out. The dataset compiled consists of 2,115 daily reports from September 28, 2007, to April 13, 
2016.  
For each of the four commodities considered in this study a separate but empirically 
congruent model is used to determine the bias in the CIF NOLA export bids. The model is a 
simple parametric approach that finds the mean of first differences of basis bids. First, the high 
basis bid of each day is subtracted from the high basis bid from the previous day to create the 
variable basis difference as defined in the equation: 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖 − 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖−1. 
We elected to use the high bid in an attempt to use data as close to actual transaction 
prices as possible. Since data representing ask prices, which are typically higher than bid prices, 
in the market could not be found, the high bids for each day should be the closest approximation 
to the actual price at which CIF NOLA forward contracts were traded at that day. The difference 




data set to avoid incorporating the difference between bids in different delivery periods.  The 
mean of the basis difference is then found, along with descriptive statistics created by SAS 
univariate procedure. To find the total bias for the life of a forward contract this mean, or 
estimate of average daily bias, the total change for the month of each delivery period is 
calculated and then added to the change from the preceding delivery periods. The reports that 
comprise the dataset used are issued daily for every week day (5 days each week), and we 
assume a standard 4 week month, resulting in a 20 market day month. In order to extrapolate the 
daily bias estimates over the life of each contract, first the daily bias estimate for each delivery 
period is multiplied by 20 to find the average bias for each delivery period. Then, the average 
bias for a delivery period is added to the average bias for each preceding delivery period to find 
the average total bias for the life of forward contract. This means that the total bias for the life of 
a one-month-out delivery period contract is simply the estimate for that delivery period 
multiplied by 20. To find the total bias for further out delivery periods, for example, delivery 
period 3, the same process is performed for delivery periods one through three, multiplying each 
estimate by twenty. Then, these products are added together to find the total bias over the life of 
a three-month-out contract so that:  
 Bias over life of contract3 = (estimate1 * 20) + (estimate2 * 20) + (estimate3 * 20). 
 Using this method, the daily estimate for the nearby delivery period, 0, is also the total 
bias for the life of the contract as the contract for delivery period 0 can be immediately delivered 
upon.  
This mean will be interpreted based on its magnitude and sign. A positive value indicates 
that on average basis bids increased from the time the bid was initially posted to the delivery date 




to forward contract. This is a result of accepting a price that is on average lower than what could 
have been received at the time of delivery if no forward contracting would have been done. The 
rationale for sellers accepting this risk premium is essentially the selling of price risk to the buyer 
(export elevator). A negative value for the mean indicates that the buyer (export elevator) is 
paying a risk premium to forward contract because on average the basis bids decreased from the 
time the bid was initially posted to the delivery date of the contract. Likewise, this is a result of 
buying on average at a price higher than what could have been paid at the time of delivery. A 
potential rationale for this behavior would be an expectation by the export elevators that at a 
future point demand for exports would exceed supply of grain to New Orleans, and therefore an 
elevator would pay the risk premium to mitigate the risk of an export shortage.  
An analysis of the first differences showed strong evidence of non-normality. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramer-von Mises, and Anderson-Darling goodness of fit tests for a 
normal distribution all rejected the null hypothesis of normality at the five percent confidence 
interval. These test statistics as well as histograms of the first differences for each commodity 
can be found in Appendix B, along with quantile distributions of the data. This non-normality is 
a result of a large number of consecutive days having the same bid, creating a difference of zero. 
As Appendix B shows, for soybeans, wheat, and sorghum, daily changes of zero represent 
approximately 75% of the observations. This number is closer to 50% for corn. Also, a common 
feature of the data is a round movement of the basis bid from one day to the next, often changing 
by five or ten cents per bushel.  This suggests that hypothesis testing using standard methods 
could result in low power, and therefore two non-parametric tests are also used, the sign test and 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Dixon and Mood (1946) suggest using the sign test as an 




of the estimates. Following Wilcoxon (1945), the signed rank test is also provided as a more 
efficient alternative to the sign test based on its ability to determine significance of magnitude as 
well as sign. 
 Results and Analysis 
The data used for the study, and the results of the models will be discussed individually. 
Each of the models yielded different results. The results from each model are reported in tables 1 
through 4, each reporting estimates for average daily bias, bias over the life of the contract, as 
well as three tests of significance for the estimates: the Student’s t test, sign test, and the 
Wilcoxon rank sign test. The estimates for bias are reported in basis units (cents per bushel for 
corn, soybeans, and wheat, and cwt for sorghum). 
This study was conducted with data collected from the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). The data were extracted from 
archived daily grain reports, with the sample period being September 28, 2007 through April 8, 
2016. Each of these daily reports includes forward bids for four different commodities: soft red 
winter wheat, corn, soybeans, and grain sorghum. For each commodity, bids are given for five 
periods beginning with the current month to four months out. These bids are given in the form of 
basis bids, which is a price relative to a given futures contract price. It should be emphasized the 
basis data only include bids. Asks or offers are not publicly available for the CIF market and we 
don’t have an historical record of this data. However, it would be reasonable to assume that these 
offers are highly correlated to bids. A recent sample of Platt’s “Daily Grains” report for January 
3, 2017, shows that the bid ask spread ranges from 1 to 4 cents/bu for different delivery periods. 
Consistent with the body of work on risk premiums involved with the forward 




were small over the life of the forward contracts, as table 2 shows. The largest in magnitude, for 
delivery period 3, is 2.94 cents per bushel over the life of the contract (using the 20 day calendar 
month outlined above) and neither the sign nor the magnitude of this estimate is significant by 
the tests provided. The sign test finds the positive value of the estimates for delivery periods 2 
and 3 (2.91 and 1.69, respectively) to be significant at the 5% confidence level. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed rank test do not find the magnitude of any of the estimates to be significant, 
however.  
 The soybean model yielded even smaller estimates for bias over the life of contract in 
basis bids. As table 3 shows, the largest estimate was 0.61¢ per bushel over 4 months for 
delivery period 4. This minimal cost is consistent with risk premium estimates for forward 
contracting soybeans in other markets found by Mallory, Zhao, and Irwin (2015). Like with corn, 
the small estimates found in soybeans contributes to the lack of any statistical significance with 
the t test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. The positive sign for delivery period 1 is significant 
with the sign test at the 5% confidence level, however, the significance of the magnitude of the 
estimate for the life of the contract (0.29¢ per bushel) cannot be determined using this test.   
 The model for wheat shows that a small bias does exist for four-month-out contracts 
(delivery period 4). Table 4 shows that the four month delivery period has a positive bias of 
1.08¢ per bushel over the life of the forward contract which the Wilcoxon signed rank test shows 
to be significant at the 10% confidence level. This suggests that wheat sellers are paying to 
mitigate price risk through forward contracts with four month out delivery periods. The 
magnitude of this estimate is smaller than that found by Brorsen, Coombs, and Anderson (1995), 
who found a 4¢ per bushel cost to sellers for forward contracting wheat using gulf elevator bids. 




bushel cost to farmers for forward contracting wheat. Although the signed rank test shows the 
estimate for delivery period 0 to be significant at the 10% confidence level, this is irrelevant 
because these contracts can be delivered on immediately. The magnitude of the estimates for the 
other delivery periods show estimates that fall short of the significance criteria, although the one 
month out delivery period does show significance at the 15% confidence level using the signed 
rank test. The sign test indicates that the sign for all of the estimates is significant at the 5% 
confidence level. In Figure 4, these estimates show little in terms of a trend over time. However, 
when considering the two statistically significant estimates, delivery period 4 and delivery period 
0, a trend does emerge showing a declining cost of forward contracting as the time to maturity 
decreases. This lends support to the premise that the risk premium is paid to minimize price risk 
over time, as the risk premium is shown decreasing as the amount of time needing risk protection 
decreases.  
The results from the Sorghum model provides the most evidence of bias in the CIF 
NOLA export bid market. As Table 5 shows, at the 5% confidence level the estimates for 
delivery periods one, three, and four show statistically significant positive bias. As discussed 
previously, this positive bias suggests that sellers of sorghum in this market (bid takers) are 
paying a risk premium for forward contracting. This is a result of the basis bid decreasing over 
the life of a forward contract on average. The magnitude of the estimates is also interesting, as 
the model shows a 14.78¢ per bushel risk premium for forward contracting sorghum over the life 
of a four month contract (delivery period four, assuming a 20 market day month).  
When studied visually in Figure 5, the trend originally seen in Figure 4 is even more 
evident. By only recognizing the estimates found to be significant by the signed rank test, a clear 




NOLA export market decreases as the length of the forward contract decreases. This further 
supports the premise that the risk premium paid is for mitigating price risk over time.  
This consistency of the results of this study with the results of similar studies in different 
markets lends credence to the relevance of this study to literature on risk premiums associated 
with forward contracting. Our conclusion that the bias found in CIF NOLA forward bids for corn 
and soybeans are small and statistically insignificant is consistent with conclusions drawn from 
Mallory, Zhao, and Irwin (2015), and Lewis, Manfredo, and Sanders (2015) for forward 
contracting corn and soybeans using local basis bids. However, the results from wheat differ 
from those found by Townsend and Brorsen (2000), more closely resembling the results found 
by Brorsen, Anderson, and Coombs (1995) in that a small (about 2¢ per bushel) cost of forward 
contracting exists for further out delivery periods. Brorsen, Anderson, and Coombs (1995) also 
used gulf export bids in their estimation, which supports the conclusion that cost of forward 
contracting in the more liquid CIF NOLA export market are smaller than what is normally 
expected when forward contracting wheat. We believe that the costs of forward contracting are 
reduced (and in the case of corn and soybeans removed) by the hybrid forward-futures nature of 
the CIF NOLA market. The large number of hedgers found on both sides (short and long) of the 
market and the ability for contracts to be traded multiple times before maturity (delivery) creates 
efficiency (McKenzie and Holt, 2002).   
The resultss show large, significant biases in the forward bids for sorghum. The likely 
cause of the difference in the amount of bias found between the bids for corn, soybeans, and 
wheat and those for sorghum is the volume of contracts bought and sold of the two groups. In 
2016, corn and soybeans accounted for 64.9 million of the 69.4 million metric tons of grain 




sorghum only accounted for 261,784 metric tons (USDA, 2017). What this suggests is that the 
market for sorghum is much less liquid than that for corn or soybeans, and to a lesser extent 
wheat. This lack of liquidity creates an inefficient market which allows one party, in this case the 
buyer or bidder, to extract a risk premium from the seller or bid taker for assuming the price risk 
associated with storing grain over time.   
An analysis of the variance of the first differences by month reveals that seasonal 
volatility could be a concern for both corn and soybeans. Appendix C shows that the markets for 
corn and soybeans are much more volatile during the months of August and September than 
throughout the rest of the year. However, seasonal volatility is much less noticeable for wheat 
and sorghum. Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 display the average daily change in CIF NOLA basis bids for 
corn, soybeans, wheat, and sorghum, respectively. The conclusion being that although the 
variance of the levels of CIF NOLA bids follows a strong seasonal pattern, the pattern of the first 
differences of the data is much weaker and more sporadic. Moreover, the results vary greatly by 
commodity, meaning that any attempt to correct for potential seasonality would need to be 






Table 5. Bias estimates for Sorghum in CIF NOLA forward BASIS Bids (¢/cwt). 
 
Table 4. Bias estimates for Sorghum in CIF NOLA forward BASIS Bids 
Table 2. Bias estimates for Corn in CIF NOLA Forward Basis Bids (¢/bu). 
 Student’s T 
Test 










Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value 
0 -0.028 -0.03 -0.16 0.8768 32 0.0541 6877 0.4929 
1 0.046 0.92 0.30 0.7627 24.5 0.1375 7709.5 0.4239 
2 0.073 2.37 0.57 0.5680 38 0.0150 12025.5 0.1501 
3 0.028 2.94 0.19 0.8516 42.5 0.0035 10276.5 0.1301 
4 -0.053 1.88 -0.46 0.6449 10.5 0.4324 772.5 0.8686 
 Student’s T 
Test 










Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value 
0 0.069 0.07 0.27 0.7884 16 0.3556 3097.5 0.7761 
1 0.015 0.29 0.08 0.9381 39.5 0.0165 2196.5 0.8248 
2 -0.001 0.27 -0.01 0.9954 13.5 0.3853 1001.5 0.8970 
3 0.012 0.51 0.11 0.9120 16 0.2694 4146 0.5146 














Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value 
0 0.096 0.10 0.81 0.4202 29 0.0396 10939 0.0741 
1 0.035 0.70 0.29 0.7743 39.5 0.0043 9385 0.1100 
2 0.002 0.73 0.01 0.9904 29.5 0.0282 7241 0.1734 
3 -0.028 0.18 -0.27 0.7895 30.5 0.0143 5725.5 0.1769 
4 0.045 1.08 0.52 0.6056 30 0.0093 5949 0.0777 
 
 Student’s T 
Test 










Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value Statistic P-Value 
0 0.155 0.15 0.94 0.3467 21.5 0.0182 2241 0.1685 
1 0.221 4.42 1.42 0.1569 23.5 0.0094 3124.5 0.0521 
2 0.078 5.98 0.39 0.7002 18.5 0.0353 2301 0.1107 
3 0.204 10.06 1.01 0.3119 19 0.0113 1967 0.0288 
4 0.236 14.78 1.24 0.2162 18 0.0032 1239 0.0105 
Table 3. Bias estimates for Soybeans in CIF NOLA forward BASIS Bids (¢/bu). 
Table 2. Bias estimates for Wheat in CIF NOLA forward BASIS Bids (¢/bu). 
 
 









Figure 2. Average bias over life of forward contract, corn. 





Figure 4. Average bias over life of forward contract, wheat. 


























































































































































































This study expands the literature on forward contracting costs of grain to include the CIF 
NOLA export bid market. The CIF NOLA market, while widely used within the grain export 
industry, has been only minimally researched academically. Understanding the function of this 
market as well as determining if any bias exists in the bids posted by export firms within the 
market is an important first step in building a body of work on the subject, and ultimately 
increasing the efficiency of the market.  
Although this study focuses only on the publicly available basis bids issued by grain 
buying export firms, another side of the market exists in the form of asking prices from grain 
sellers. As previously discussed, CIF NOLA forward contracts are traded similar to typical 
futures contract, being bought and sold multiple times before maturity. If the ask prices could be 
obtained, perhaps from private firms participating in the market, then the standard bid/ask 
structure typically found in markets would allow a more complete analysis of the market 
characteristics to be performed.  
The opportunity also exists to expand upon this study by defining the relationship 
between basis bids given at the Gulf in New Orleans and those given at inland locations along 
the Mississippi River such as Memphis and Minneapolis. Finding a lagged causal relationship 
between Gulf bids and inland bids could help explain the behavior grain buying firms and help 
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Quantiles N = 9413 
Level Quantile 




75% Q3 1 
50% Median 0 




0% Min -104 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
Test Statistic p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.31251 Pr > D <0.010 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 381.55106 Pr > W-Sq <0.005 








Quantiles N = 9810 
Level Quantile 




75% Q3 0 
50% Median 0 




0% Min -106 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
Test Statistic p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.28416 Pr > D <0.010 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 349.04698 Pr > W-Sq <0.005 




















Quantiles N = 9327 
Level Quantile 




75% Q3 0 
50% Median 0 




0% Min -115 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
Test Statistic p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.33604 Pr > D <0.010 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 273.19986 Pr > W-Sq <0.005 















Quantiles N = 5828 
Level Quantile 




75% Q3 0 
50% Median 0 




0% Min -105 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Normal Distribution 
Test Statistic p Value 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.39611 Pr > D <0.010 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 264.11356 Pr > W-Sq <0.005 

























With analyses of both the Mississippi River barge freight market and the CIF NOLA 
forward market complete, a more accurate picture of the workings of this system is available. The 
interdependence of the two markets has been illustrated as well as the unique characteristics that 
define each market.  
The Mississippi River barge freight market is described in detail, outlining the specifics of 
barge transportation including contract terms, vessels dimensions, and travel times. Then, an 
empirical analysis is performed, determining that significant costs of forward contracting exist, 
and that depending on the season in which the transportation is needed, the party paying the cost 
varies. For the Twin Cities location, the cost of forward contracting is paid by the seller of the 
barge freight in every season. However, for every other location, the seller of the barge freight 
only pays this cost during the summer season, season 2, while the buyer of the barge freight pays 
a cost of forward contracting during seasons 1 and 3. This means that elevators purchasing barge 
freight can receive freight costs in this forward market that are lower than the subsequent spot 
price for barge freight at the time of delivery, on average, during seasons 1 and 3. But, during 
season 2 this is reversed, meaning forward prices are higher on average than subsequent spot 
prices. This suggests that firms should purchase freight in the spot market during seasons 1 and 3 
and in the forward market during season 2 to minimize transportation costs, on average. Data 
detailing the volume of barges unloaded at the port of New Orleans by month, as well as the 
number of up-bound empty barges by month is then provided as evidence to explain this pattern 
of varying costs of forward contracting. The conclusion being that costs are paid by the seller 




The CIF NOLA market is explained and evidence is provided to support the claim that the 
forward market functions in a manner similar to a futures market. Positions can be offset before 
delivery so that contracts can be used simply as a means of risk management without physical 
delivery. Furthermore, the settlement process is described as distinct from either traditional 
forward or futures contracts. Empirically, we find that significant costs of forward contracting exist 
in the sorghum market, however, contracts for corn, soybeans, and wheat have little or no cost of 
forward contracting associated with their use. A possible explanation for this pattern is provided 
through data on the volume of each commodity exported from the port of New Orleans annually. 
The volume of corn, soybean and wheat exports each vastly outnumber the volume of sorghum 
exports. This volume in corn, soybean, and wheat contracts likely provides efficiency to this 
liquidly traded forward market, removing any costs of forward contracting potentially associated 
with their use. This implies that for these three commodities the CIF NOLA forward market can 
be used as a means of price risk management without paying embedded costs of forward 
contracting which are typical of typical farmer-elevator forward contracts.  
Together, these two studies provide a detailed description and analysis of the existing 
system of moving grain down the Mississippi River system to the port of New Orleans for export. 
The institutional details of the markets are described and empirical analyses are performed to show 
how these markets perform their functions and provide potential strategies for their use.  
 
 
 
 
  
